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Responding to Crises: 
 
A Test of the Situational Crisis Communication Theory 
 
Courtney Wright 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Crisis management includes efforts designed to prevent and to detect potential 
crises, and to learn from crisis experiences.  The SCCT posits that certain crisis responses 
(matched) produce better outcomes for organizations than others (unmatched), depending 
on the situation.  In addition, the results from this study attempt to support the situational 
crisis communication theory in aiding crisis managers in protecting their organizations 
against crises. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Crisis communication management is a public relations function that is 
increasingly important to the achievement of organizational goals.  Media coverage of 
organizations facing crisis situations is abundant.  During the next five years, 83 percent 
of companies will face a crisis that will negatively impact the profitability of the 
company by 20 to 30 percent, according to new research by Oxford-Metrica, an 
independent adviser on risk, value, reputation and governance (Aon, 2006).  For instance, 
the 1989 Exxon Valdez crisis cost the company billions.  It is estimated that some Exxon 
station sales decreased by 30 percent.  The company saw a drop of 43 percent from its 
1988 profits as a result of the oil spill.  In addition, the net income per share also 
decreased from $1.06 to $.37 (Small, 1991). 
An organization may encounter a variety of crisis situations.  According to 
Pearson and Clair (1998), a plethora of potential crises exist, including corporate 
misdeeds, product tampering, and environmental and natural disasters, to name a few.  
The Institute for Crisis Management states that crisis-prone industries include 
medical/surgical manufacturers, software manufacturers, pharmaceutical manufacturers, 
telecommunication companies, computer manufacturers, commercial banks, solid waste 
disposal companies, security and commodity brokers, life insurance companies, and the 
airline industry.  Therefore, effective crisis management is important to a broad range of 
organizations. 
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Background 
A review of literature indicates that minimal attention has been devoted to crisis 
management theory. According to Coombs (2008), theory development in crisis 
communication is behind general public relations theory development because this 
specialized area of inquiry is still in its theoretical infancy, despite its importance in 
practice. This is supported by Seegar, Sellnow, and Ulmer (1998), who found a lack of 
theory-based approaches in reviews of crisis communication literature.  Crisis 
communication has created a large body of practical research, but scant theory has 
emerged (Coombs, 2007). 
Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to further current theory-driven research in public 
relations by examining the  perception of the effect crisis management strategies have on 
organizational reputation, crisis responsibility, and potential supportive behavior of an 
organization.  Specifically, this study seeks to test the situational crisis communication 
theory to determine its ability to predict effective crisis response strategies. 
Crisis Defined 
  
To better understand the current state of crisis management research, it is 
necessary to review the development of this area of public relations scholarship.  To date, 
scholars have developed commonalities regarding crisis situations that are used to define 
the concept.  For example, Fearn-Banks (1996) defines a crisis as “a major occurrence 
with a potentially negative outcome affecting an organization, company, or industry, as 
well as its publics, products, services, or good name” (p. 1).  Sociologist R.L. Hamblin 
(1958) argues a crisis is “…an urgent situation in which all group members face a 
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common threat” (p.  322). According to Pauchant and Mitroff (1992), a crisis is “a 
disruption that physically affects a system as a whole and threatens its basic assumptions, 
its subjective sense of self, its existential core” (p. 12).  Fink (1986) claims a crisis is any 
event that may escalate in intensity; fall under close media and government scrutiny, 
interfere with normal business operations, and may affect the image and bottom line of a 
company.  In 1993, Barton stated that a crisis “[was] a major, unpredictable event that has 
potentially negative results.  The event and its aftermath may significantly damage an 
organization and its employees, products, services, financial condition, and reputation” 
(p. 2).  Lerbinger (1997) defines a crisis as “an event that brings, or has the potential for 
bringing, an organization into disrepute and imperils its future profitability, growth, and 
possibly its very survival” (p. 4).  Finally, Pearson and Clair (1998) view a crisis as “a 
low-probability, high-impact event that threatens the viability of the organization and is 
characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of resolution, as well as by a 
belief that decisions must be made swiftly” (p. 60).   
 Even though these definitions are slightly different, a closer examination reveals 
numerous similarities.  According to King (2002), a crisis has three primary 
characteristics.  First, a crisis is an unplanned event that has the potential to dismantle the 
internal and external structure of an organization.  Second, a crisis can occur at any time.  
Finally, a crisis has the potential to affect the legitimacy of an organization.  The media 
can influence public perception in regards to issues involving cause, blame, response, 
resolution, and consequences.  When an organization is presented in a negative light, its 
legitimacy may be threatened (King, 2002; Ray, 1999). 
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 Once an organization is presented in a negative light, the probability of the 
organization surviving the crisis is dramatically reduced.  Fearn-Banks (1996) 
emphasizes, in her seminal work on crisis communication, the need for organizations to 
develop and implement effective crisis management and communication plans.   
 This study attempts to contribute to the current theory-driven research in crisis 
communication by examining crisis response strategies from a communication-centered 
perspective.  Specifically, this study seeks to further understanding of crisis 
communication by examining the effect of a crisis when a matched or unmatched 
response strategy is used by an organization facing a crisis due to an accident.  The crisis 
type as well as the strategy used in this study is derived from Coombs’ situational crisis 
communication theory.  This theory and its origins will be introduced and discussed in 
the following literature review. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
What is to be communicated and by whom within an organization are important 
factors in crisis communication.  Crisis communication is “the communication between 
the organization and its publics prior to, during, and after the negative occurrence” 
(Fearn-Banks, 1996, p. 2; King, 2002).  This definition of crisis communication will be 
the referenced definition throughout this study.  However, in the next paragraph, several 
versions of the definition will be provided to show different perspectives.  During the 
communication phase, the organization must appear to be in control to members external 
to the [organization] (Heath, 1994; King, 2002).  Such behavior will direct stakeholders’ 
physical and psychological responses, as well as impressions about the organization 
(King, 2002; Ray, 1999).  To do this, crisis managers may use an array of response 
strategies, which will be discussed later in the chapter. 
Crisis Communication and Crisis Management 
 Crisis management differs from crisis communication in the fact that it represents 
a “systematic attempt by organizational members with external stakeholders to avert 
crises or to effectively manage those that do occur” (Pearson & Clair, 1998).  In this case, 
the organization and members of the crisis management team attempt to remove some of 
the risk and uncertainty that would not allow the organization to be in control of its own 
destiny (Fearn-Banks, 1996; King, 2002).  In addition, the crisis management team must 
decide what issues must be addressed within a crisis plan.  Constructing a crisis 
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management plan may be difficult due to the situational characteristics of a crisis and its 
many changing variables.    
 Effective crisis communication management is difficult to achieve since each 
crisis is different from the next.  What an organization says and does once a crisis begins 
(the crisis response) can have a significant effect on the success of the crisis management 
effort (Benoit, 1997; Coombs, 1999).  Researchers have just begun to explore the 
dynamics of the crisis response process (Benoit, 1995, 1997; Coombs & Holladay, 1996).   
The next section explores crisis communication management from seminal work 
when few crisis responses were documented and made available to crisis managers to the 
development and testing of crisis response strategies and their effectiveness in achieving 
organizational goals. 
Crisis Communication Management in the Beginning 
    
Crisis communication management, in public relations research, has lagged in 
research and theory development (Coombs, 2006).  Although, according to Coombs 
(2007), crisis communication management is considered a subset of public relations, 
tactics of public relations are used to disseminate information to the appropriate 
stakeholders and publics during a crisis, thus, qualifying crisis communication 
management as a form of public relations.  
Up until the incidents of the Johnson & Johnson and the Exxon cases, pre-crisis 
management had been deemed symbolic because, for too many years, crisis 
communication research was simply practitioner truisms and tales from the field:  “What 
I did during our crisis” (Coombs, 2006). However, these two crises provided benchmarks 
in crisis communication management research on what to do and what not to do during a 
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crisis and how to prevent it from happening again.  Due to their influence on the 
development of crisis communication theory, these two seminal cases are briefly 
reviewed in the following section to clearly portray what happens when a crisis is 
handled properly and when a crisis is handled poorly. 
 Johnson & Johnson Tylenol Case.  In 1982, some Tylenol capsules were found 
laced with cyanide in the Chicago area.  This product tampering resulted in seven deaths.  
To this day, the identity of the person or persons who committed the Tylenol product 
tampering is still unknown.  All supplies of the product in stores nationwide were pulled 
off the shelves by Johnson & Johnson, at a cost of $50 million.  After due time and 
investigation, the product was reissued in tamper-resistant containers, and a sealed 
package of capsules was offered free to consumers who had discarded the suspect 
supplies in their possession (Center & Jackson, 2003). 
 During the aftershock of the crisis, Tylenol miraculously recovered the market 
share it held prior to the crisis.  Despite initial losses, the company was able to regain its 
credibility and reestablish public trust.  As a result, Johnson & Johnson set the benchmark 
for successful crisis management.  The question that needs to be answered now is how 
was Johnson & Johnson able to gain the market and its image and reputation back after a 
tumultuous crisis such as the cyanide-laced capsules?  The phrase, “no good deed goes 
unpunished,” holds true to Johnson & Johnson because the standards that the company 
holds itself to were the pillars of its success in handling the crisis.  The following factors, 
according to Center and Jackson (2003), are the main reasons Johnson & Johnson came 
out on top: 
1. “The company benefited from a long history of success and service in a field of 
“beneficial” and “worthwhile” healthcare products.” 
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2. “Johnson & Johnson took pride in its public visibility and its reputation for 
integrity.” 
3. “The company benefited by having had a strong founder who believed that “the 
corporation should be socially responsible, with responsibilities to society that 
went far beyond the usual sales and profit motives (Baker, 1993).  Johnson & 
Johnson, basically, set high standards for itself to set a distinguishing tradition 
that shall be continued as long as the company is in business.” 
4. “There was a credo, a “For this we stand” on paper, which succeeding generations 
of executives have built and interpreted in terms of changing times an challenges.  
The credo was brought out during the crisis for the world to see.” 
5. “In its relations with employees, neighbors, investors, customers, and government 
agencies, there was a candor consistent with competitive and financial security.  
Company spokespeople – including the CEO – showed leadership and authority.” 
6. “There was a recognition of the public interest and its legitimate representation by 
news media.  Information, whether good or bad, was forth coming as rapidly as it 
developed.” 
7. “The corporate public relations function was part of the management, 
participating in the decision process and in the implementation when 
communication was involved.” 
8. “There were mechanisms for feedback from constituent publics, and a high value 
was placed on public input” (Center & Jackson, 2003, p. 187). 
Johnson & Johnson’s success in crisis management stands in sharp contrast to the 
example set by the Exxon Corporation. 
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Case.  It was supposed to be a routine trip from the Prince 
William Sound to Long Beach, California for the Exxon Valdez, a 987-foot oil tanker.  
The tanker, commanded by Captain Joseph Hazelwood, was “longer than three football 
fields, [and] loaded to the top with enough oil to fill the Rose Bowl almost halfway to the 
top” (Turning Point, 1994). 
 Unfortunately, the Exxon Valdez never made its destination to Long Beach 
because on March 24, 1989, the oil tanker ran aground the Bligh Reef in Prince William 
Sound, Alaska.  The Exxon Valdez spilled 240,000 barrels (10 million gallons) of oil into 
the water.  The oil slick was 10 feet wide, four miles long, and eventually covered 1,300 
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miles of shoreline.  An estimated 2 million animals died as a result, including 1 million 
migratory fowl, a third of the sea otter population, and numerous seals and sea lions.  
This estimate does not include the number of clams and fish on whom Alaskan fishermen 
depend for their livelihood (Fearn-Banks, 2007). 
 However, the real crisis mishap occurred when Exxon refused to take 
responsibility for the crisis.  Exxon blamed anyone and/or anything from the captain of 
the Exxon Valdez to the out-of-date radar of the U.S. Coast Guard.  In the wake of the 
crisis, Exxon blamed the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, U.S. Coast Guard, the 
Alaskan government, weather, and the Department of Environmental Conservation.  The 
giant conglomerate also went as far as to blame the captain, Joseph Hazelwood, and the 
third mate, Gregory Cousins, because reports came out that Hazelwood was intoxicated 
during the incident and handed over the responsibility of the ship to an inexperienced 
Cousins (Fearn-Banks, 2007).   
 The then-CEO of Exxon, Lawrence G. Rawl, was one of the last people to 
communicate about the crisis when he should have been the first.  Unlike Tylenol, Exxon 
did not have a strategic chain of command to handle the crisis.  In the wake of the spill, 
rather than Rawl becoming the spokesperson like a CEO should, Frank Iarossi, then-
president of Exxon shipping, was the main representative at the Valdez site (Fearn-
Banks, 2007).  There was no presence of remorse from the top executives.  It took Rawl 
10 days to formally issue a response to the public, which came in the form of an open 
letter. 
 During the initial response to clean-up the spill, Exxon barely participated in any 
efforts in containing and cleaning the crisis.  Atlantic Richfield (ARCO), British 
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Petroleum (BP), and five other companies initially participated in the response.  Exxon 
soon after took over the clean-up efforts from the other companies (Fearn-Banks, 2007). 
 Information about the crisis was disseminated poorly.  Iarossi did not keep 
Exxon’s publics informed and when he did make a statement, the information turned out 
to be erroneous the majority of the time.  
 It is important to understand why the cases of Tylenol and Exxon Valdez are 
important to crisis communication management.  During a time of scant crisis 
communication study, these cases showed how a crisis can be handled in a successfully 
orchestrated manner, with positive organizational outcomes, or how a poor inappropriate 
organizational response can result in significant negative outcomes for an organization.  
With the occurrences of the Tylenol and Exxon Valdez cases, crisis communication 
management spawned into a more strategic study of how to handle crises to achieve more 
positive organizational outcomes.  Through the years, crisis communication has started a 
slow transition from “What I did during our crisis” to a more theoretical approach to 
handling a crisis.  Out of theory came the situational crisis communication theory that 
posits a crisis response taxonomy.        
Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) 
Crisis management includes efforts designed to prevent and to detect potential 
crises, and to learn from crisis experiences (Caponigro, 2000; Cohn, 2000; Coombs, 
1999b; Mitroff, 2001).  Moreover, crisis management has emphasized post-crisis 
communication and the use of crisis response strategies – what organizational leaders say 
and do after a crisis hits (Coombs, 2007).  Integrated with Benoit’s (1995) image 
restoration and Hearit’s (1994) corporate apologia, the situational crisis communications 
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theory (SCCT) model attempts to map out post-crisis communication. More specifically, 
the model illustrates how crisis response strategies can be used to protect reputational 
assets after the presentation of instructing information, which is the first communication 
priority in a crisis (Sturges, 1994).  According to Bergman (1994), Coombs (1998), and 
Sturges (1994), the SCCT attempts to explain the type of information that instructs 
stakeholders what to do to protect themselves from the crisis, the basics of what 
happened, and what the organization is doing to fix the situation and to prevent a 
recurrence of the problem.   
For any crisis, compassion should be the primary response strategy that 
organizations contemplate when the source of the crisis is uncertain.  Compassion is 
suggested as the answer to any crisis where fault is unknown because some crises 
produce victims and victims place unique demands on crisis managers (Ogrizek & 
Guiller, 1999).  Expressing compassion involves acknowledging and expressing 
sympathy for victims without accepting responsibility or stating remorse in order to avoid 
litigation issues.  Legal expert, J. Cohen (1999), supports the recommendation that 
compassion be used when fault is unclear.  Most accidents and product recalls (either 
human or technical error) have unclear fault at the onset of the crisis and may take weeks 
or months to clarify (Ray, 1999).   
 According to Coombs (2007), the SCCT posits that the crisis situation determines 
which crisis response strategies will be most effective in protecting the organization’s 
reputation.  Reputational assets are important to an organization and are threatened by a 
crisis. It follows that crisis managers should try to maximize the reputational protection 
afforded by using appropriate crisis response strategies. 
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Historical Development of SCCT 
 The SCCT has been the focus of numerous studies over the past (Coombs, 2007).  
To fully understand the development of the SCCT, it is important to understand the 
theoretical perspectives of Benoit’s Image Repair Discourse and Hearit’s apologia which 
have informed the growth of the SCCT. 
Benoit’s Image Repair Discourse.  When people, groups, and organizations are 
accused of objectionable behavior, reputations can be damaged (Benoit & Brinson, 
1999).  An organization’s image, or reputation, is a valuable asset that represents trust, 
loyalty, and responsibility granted to an organization.  In other words, when an 
organization fails to live up to its promises and expectations, negative consequences can 
occur for consumers, ranging from inconvenience to death.  Whenever an organization is 
faced with a crisis that tarnishes its image, a domino effect of events starts to occur.  
When one crisis happens in an organization, customers immediately begin to become 
skeptical of how they use or buy that organization’s products or services.  After that 
initial shock of crisis, a domino effect, of sorts, starts to occur.  An [organization’s] 
image could influence how closely the government regulates its actions.  Reputation can 
influence the price of a company’s stock.  It can even influence how other companies 
deal with it (e.g., terms offered for loans or credit; how long a supplier is willing to wait 
for payment or how much of a discount will be offered on a purchase) (Benoit & Pang, 
2007).  Thus, whether an organization be large or small, it is important for it to 
continuously maintain and portray a positive image.   
 Crises and threats that have the potential to disrupt or tarnish an organization’s 
image are constantly threatening organizations today.  Some organizations are may face 
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several crises in a day, but they are never heard of because of their low threat level.  
However, it is the major crises that make it past the stakeholders and into the media that 
many organizations dread each day.  That is why it is so true when Pinsdorf (1987) 
acknowledged that public relations crises “are no longer a matter of if, but when; no 
longer the exception, but the expected – even the inevitable” (p. 37).  This proactive 
stance has led many companies to take extensive measures of crisis prevention and image 
preservation.  This section explicates the theory of image repair discourse, which 
provides the foundation for the situation crisis communication theory’s (SCCT) responses 
to organizational crisis.  However, we will begin with developing and understanding 
messages used to respond to corporate image crises. 
 To completely understand the theory, it is important to define image.  Image is 
nothing but a symbolic thought that is created in one’s mind about a representation of a 
certain feeling or object.  However, in the realm of corporate image, a corporation’s 
image is a subjective impression of that business held by other people.  A corporation’s 
(or person’s or organization’s) image, or reputation, is subjective because it arises from 
the information held by people about that corporation.  Our perceptions of an 
organization (or person or group) are formed from the words and deeds of that 
organization – and from what others say and do about that organization.  So, in a much 
abridged version, an image is a subjective impression of an organization formed through 
one’s experience with that organization and interpreted are based on other past 
experiences (Benoit & Pang, 2007, pp. 244-245).   
 Benoit and Pang (2007) also implied that an image is a subjective impression that 
will vary from one person to another.  It is unlikely that two people will have identical 
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experiences.  Furthermore, even if they did have the exact same experiences with a given 
organization, their other unique experiences are likely to dominate their own 
interpretations of the information they share about the organization.  Other people will 
often have similar impressions of an organization, but it is unlikely that any two people 
will have precisely the same impression of an organization where some people, of course, 
will have widely disparate impressions of a firm.  So, more than likely, different people 
can be expected to have different images of a given corporation (Moffitt, 1994).  
 The image restoration literature is heavy on description and retrospective sense-
making through case studies, whereas it is short on predictive value and causal inferences 
(Coombs & Schmidt, 2000).  Scientific evidence demands the process of comparison.  
The knowledge gained from a one-shot case study is generally illusory (Campbell & 
Stanley, 1963).   
 Image restoration analysts tend to generate a list of image restoration strategies 
employed in the case and then speculate on how these strategies promoted success or 
failure of an image restoration effort (Coombs & Schmidt, 2000).  According to Coombs 
and Schmidt (2000), the typical image restoration analysis provides limited insight into 
how publics reacted to the strategies and the actual effect of the strategies on the 
organizational image.  These limits preclude (a) developing precise additions to the body 
of knowledge and (b) allowing crisis managers to draw from the full benefits that image 
restoration theory has to offer crisis communication.  
 In 2000, Coombs and Schmidt, made it aware that; to understand how publics 
react to different image restoration strategies in different types of crises if crisis managers 
are to learn when certain response strategies should be used or avoided, we must become 
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more prescriptive so that crisis managers have clearer guidelines for selecting their image 
restoration strategies.  In other words, for crisis managers to help organizations protect 
their image during a crisis, it is urgent for an organization to present a clear picture of the 
organization’s current image to its stakeholders for crisis managers to provide 
organizations with concise information on how to continuously and actively preserve the 
organization’s image. To do this, Coombs and Schmidt (2000) suggested that there are at 
least two options for developing more exact prescriptive knowledge.  The first option is 
to execute a series of similar case studies.  Using a series of similar case studies would 
allow the researcher to find patterns that would indicate the effect of specific strategies in 
a particular type of crisis.  For example, a number of collapsed mines crises and the 
image restoration strategies that were used could be examined.  If a specific strategy is 
associated with successful crisis management, then it is safe to assume that that strategy 
should be used in other collapsed mines crises.  We can be more confident in the 
implications of a case study if a number of case studies are conducted and a pattern of 
similar results emerge (Coombs & Schmidt, 2000).   
 The second option is to empirically examine the effect of various strategies that 
were employed in a crisis case.  Coombs and Schmidt (2000) suggested testable research 
that could come out of the descriptive list of strategies identified in a case study to 
determine their true effects on publics.  Respondents can read or view videotapes of the 
image response strategies and complete surveys designed to assess their reactions to the 
strategies.  The claims made about the effects of strategies are tested to see if they hold 
true.  The researcher controls the image response strategies by exposing respondents to 
different strategies and then measuring their reactions for comparisons.  The empirical 
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tests are another way of moving from speculation to knowledge (Coombs & Schmidt, 
2000).   
 Analysis of image repair discourse suggests that there are many points of views in 
understanding and influencing images.  For the most part, our image of a company is 
based on what we have seen, heard, and read about that [organization] (Benoit & Pang, 
2007).  The way a stakeholder perceives a particular organization depends on how that 
organization communicates to the stakeholder, which, in turns produces an image or 
impression of that organization.  Other points of views that strongly influence how we 
look at an organization’s image are through the words and actions of other people.  This 
means an image can be influenced (and threatened or damaged) by the accusations, 
complaints, and behavior of others (Benoit & Pang, 2007).  And when an organization’s 
image is susceptible to being damaged, it is critical for that organization to take the 
necessary precautions to prevent a potential image distortion or take immediate action in 
repairing image. 
 According to Benoit and Pang (2007), observing that an image is an impression 
also means that an image may be at odds with reality.  This can be harmful to an 
organization because even though a particular situation may not seem like a threat to an 
organization, an organization that was or is currently perceived in a negative light may 
experience a biased perception.  Reality and image, combined, can cause major problems 
for an organization because perception can be more important than reality and this is 
where image repair discourse meets communication.  In a 2007 article, Benoit and Pang 
stated that [a] company inappropriately accused of wrongdoing must use communication 
to correct this mistaken image.  They added that sometimes people see what they want to 
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see and fail to see what they do not want to see.  The truth can repair an image, but if the 
relevant audience refuses to accept the truth, reality cannot help the unfairly damaged 
image.  So image and image repair both arise from reality but must be shaped through 
communication.  Furthermore, reality clearly influences images, but rarely do people 
have a complete knowledge of the facts, and what they do know is filtered or interpreted 
by their personal attitudes and experiences (Benoit & Pang, 2007).   
 Image repair discourse does not pertain solely to organizations, but discourse may 
also be implemented with individuals as well.  Even though organizations have better 
resources than individuals to repair their image, the basic options are the same for both 
individual and corporate image repair efforts (Benoit & Pang, 2007).  To really protect a 
brand, a corporate official, at times, must act as an individual to reach out to stakeholders 
rather than speak for the organization all of the time.  Thus, writing on both corporate and 
individual image repair can be useful. 
Image Repair Theory and Crisis Management.  Benoit (2007) and his colleagues 
have developed the theory of image repair discourse and applied it in a variety of 
contexts:  corporate (Benoit 1995a, 1995b; 1998; Benoit & Brinson, 1999; Benoit & 
Czerwinski, 1997; Benoit & Hirson, 2001; Benoit & Pang, 2007; Blaney, Benoit, & 
Brazeal, 2002; Brinson & Benoit, 1996); political (Benoit 1995a, 1999; Benoit, Gullifor 
& Panici, 1991; Benoit & McHale, 1999; Benoit & Nill, 1998a; Benoit & Pang, 2007; 
Benoit & Wells, 1998; Kennedy & Benoit, 1997; Len-Rios & Benoit, 2004); international 
(Benoit & Brinson, 1999; Benoit & Pang, 2007; Drumheller & Benoit, 2004; Zhang & 
Benoit, 2004; Zhang & Benoit, in press); and other contexts (Benoit, 1997a; Benoit & 
Anderson, 1996; Benoit & Hanczor, 1994; Benoit & Nill, 1998b; Benoit & Pang, 2007; 
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Blaney & Benoit, 1997-2001).  The next section explains the relationship of image repair 
discourse and crisis communication. 
 As stated by Benoit and Pang (2007), images [can] be threatened when another 
person obtains information that creates an unfavorable impression about another person 
or organization and when images are damaged undeservedly.  An organization runs a 
great risk of its image becoming tarnished when an organization is falsely accused of a 
crisis in a malicious manner, whether it be in disregard of the truth or by mistake.  
Threats to image that are not based in reality can be just as damaging as threats arising 
from the accused’s harmful actions (Benoit & Pang, 2007).  And this is when 
communication is important to crisis management and image repair discourse.  It is with 
communication that we are successful in repairing false accusations.   
Another philosophy that should be followed when dealing with image repair 
theory is that image, and threat to image, arise from the perceptions of the audience 
(Benoit & Pang, 2007).  This philosophy allows that one person can have a totally 
different perception of a situation than that of the person standing next to them.  That is 
why it is crucial to take different perspectives into account when dealing with image 
restoration.   Benoit and Pang (2007) were lead to another important observation:  It is 
vital to realize that businesses frequently must deal with several audiences.  Identification 
of the key audience or audiences is important because different audiences often have 
diverse interests, concerns, and goals (Benoit & Pang, 2007).  When a crisis 
communicator has preserved an organization’s image amongst their diverse stakeholders, 
Hearit’s apologia should be incorporated with the image repair discourse to provide the 
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proper message that should be disseminated amongst the stakeholders to preserve the 
established positive image of the organization. 
Hearit’s Apologia.  It is important to understand that when apologia is used by an 
organization, it does not necessarily mean that an organization is apologizing for its 
actions in a crisis by accepting full responsibility.  The organization’s effort may deny, 
explain, or apologize for the action through communication discourse (Fearn-Banks, 
2007).   
 Corporate apologia has been deployed for decades by organizations when dealing 
with organizational crises.  This next section will define apologia as well as explicate its 
conceptual fundamentals. 
 The first theoretical framework for apologia was introduced in an essay by Ware 
and Linkugel (1973).  During their research and studies of apologia, Ware and Linkugel 
(1973), observed four factors and four postures used in apologetic speaking.  These 
factors and postures, which will be discussed next, were discovered in social scientific 
research on the resolution of belief dilemmas, mastered by Abelson (1959.   
 The first identified factor, denial, occurs when one denies “alleged facts, 
sentiments, objects, or relationships” (Ware & Linkugel, 1973, p. 275).  The second 
factor is bolstering, which is the obverse of denial because denial involves negation and 
bolstering involves identification.  “Bolstering refers to any rhetorical strategy which 
reinforces the existence of a fact, sentiment, object, or relationship” (p. 277).  The 
“speaker attempts to identify [themselves] with something viewed favorably by the 
audience” (p. 277).  Denial and bolstering are known as reformative strategies because 
they “do not attempt to change the audience’s meaning or affect for whatever is in 
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question” (pp. 275-276); they “simply revise or amend the cognitions of the audience” (p. 
276).   
 The third factor is differentiation, which serves “the purpose of separating some 
fact, sentiment, object, or relationship from some larger context within which the 
audience presently views that attribute” (Ware & Linkugel, p. 278).  The fourth factor, 
transcendence, is the obverse of differentiation because whereas differentiation moves 
toward the less abstract, transcendence moves toward the more abstract.  Transcendence 
“cognitively joins some fact, sentiment, object or relationship with some larger context 
within which the audience does not presently view that attribute” (p. 280).  
Differentiation and transcendence are transformative strategies that involve a change in 
meaning. 
 When the factors for apologia were identified and described, Ware and Linkugel 
(1973) identified the four postures that apologetic speakers can refer to: absolution, 
vindication, explanation, and justification.  Each of these postures involves the 
combination of one transformative factor with one reformative factor.  The first posture is 
absolution, which results from the union of the differentiation and denial factors and it “is 
one in which the speaker seeks acquittal” (p. 282).  Vindication, the second posture, 
involves denial and transcendence and “aims not only at the preservation of the accused’s 
reputation, but also at the recognition of his grater worth as a human being relative to the 
worth of his accusers” (p. 283).  The third posture is explanation, which combines 
bolstering and differentiation.  “In the explanative address, the speaker assumes that if the 
audience understands his motives, actions, beliefs, or whatever, they will be unable to 
condemn him” (p. 283).  The fourth posture is justification, which occurs when bolstering 
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and transcendence are joined.  Justification “asks not only for understanding, but also for 
approval” (p. 283). 
 Although the exigencies for apologia are ethical in nature, Hoff (1980) notes that 
management should ask if the corporation did something wrong.  Is there a need to justify 
or defend an action? 
SCCT’s Current Articulation 
The situational crisis communication theory was developed after J.A. Benson 
(1998) challenged the crisis communication field to support his theory that there are a set 
number of crisis types and crisis response strategies.  The SCCT matches each crisis to its 
most appropriate response strategy.  Coombs (2007) stated that meaningful matching is 
possible only if there is some correspondence/link between crisis types and crisis 
response strategies.  To create this link, SCCT drew from attribution theory and 
neoinstitutional theory, which are reviewed below. 
Attribution Theory.  This theory is a useful framework for explaining the relation 
between a situation and the selection of communication strategies (Coombs & Holladay, 
1996).  Research demonstrates that people search for causes of events in a variety of 
domains (Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988).  McAuley, Duncan and Russell (1992) 
identified four causal dimensions people might use when making attribution:  stability, 
external control, personal control, and locus.  Stability assesses if the event’s cause 
happens frequently (stable) or infrequently (unstable).  External control indicates whether 
or not the event’s cause is controllable.  Personal control assesses whether or not the 
event’s cause is controllable by the actor.  Locus reflects if the event’s cause is something 
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about the actor or something about the situation (McAuley et al., 1992; Russell, 1982; 
Wilson, 1993).   
 Research indicates a substantial overlap between personal control and locus 
(Coombs & Holladay, 1996).  Wilson (1993) suggests that the two causal dimensions be 
taken as one dimension that reflects intentionality of an act.  When both are high in an 
actor, perceptions of intentional actions are created, while unintentional actions are 
created when both are low in an actor.  Although measures have been developed for four 
dimensions (McAuley et al., 1992), functionally there are three causal dimensions:  
stability, external control, and locus/personal control (locus, for short). 
 The judgments people make about these three causal dimensions influence their 
feelings and behaviors toward the actor (Weiner, 1985; Weiner et al., 1988; Wilson et al., 
1993).  People’s attributions to an event can be changed in two ways depending on 
explanations given by the actors.  First, the messages can shape how people perceive the 
three attribution dimensions.  Second, the messages can affect the feelings created by the 
attributions (Weiner et al., 1988).  People make attributions about an organization for a 
crisis when they determine the cause of the crisis.  Greater attributions of responsibility 
lead to stronger feelings of anger and a more negative view of an actor’s image (Weiner, 
Amirhan, Folkes, & Verette, 1987). 
 The three causal dimensions of attribution should affect evaluations of 
organizational responsibility for a crisis in predictable ways (Coombs & Holladay, 1996).  
According to Coombs and Holladay (1996), organizational crisis responsibility should be 
perceived as strongest if the cause is stable (i.e., the organization has a history of crisis), 
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external control (controlled by others outside the organization) is low, and the locus is 
strongly internal (unintentionality is high).   
Coombs and Holladay (1996) also stipulate that when a crisis event is repeated 
(stable), publics are more likely to attribute responsibility to the organization.  Moreover, 
attributions of low external control indicate that the crisis was not under the control of 
groups outside of the organization; thus, the crisis should not be attributed to external 
agents.  Attributions that entail a strong internal locus/intentionality suggest that the 
organization could have done something to prevent the crisis (Coombs & Holladay, 
1996).  This type of attribution suggests that the organization knew what to do to prevent 
the crisis and any steps needed to contain it. 
 Coombs and Holladay (1996) stated that organizational crisis responsibility 
should be weakest when attributions suggest the cause is unstable (i.e., the crisis is an 
exception in the organization’s performance history), with strong external control and 
weak internal locus (low intentionality).  Attributions, as found by Coombs and Holladay 
(1996), reflecting strong external control and low intentionality (weak internal locus) 
suggest that factors outside the organization and its control are responsible for the crisis 
event.  An unstable crisis creates weak attributions of organization responsibility 
(Coombs & Holladay, 1996), such as when circumstances are beyond the organization’s 
control and the crisis cannot be prevented. 
 One objective of crisis management is to prevent or lessen reputational damage to 
an organization (Barton, 1993; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993; Sturges, 1994).  According to 
Coombs and Holladay (1996), attributions of organizational crisis responsibility should 
precipitate reputational damage.  If communication can alter public’s causal attributions 
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or affect feelings generated by these attributions, crisis response strategies can be used to 
reduce reputational damage.   
 Neoinstitutionalism Theory.  An organization is granted legitimacy if stakeholders 
believe an organization is good and/or has a right to continue operations (Allen & 
Cailouet, 1994; Bedeian, 1989).  Legitimacy is critical to the successful operation of an 
organization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) because it is a conformation of social rules and 
expectations established by stakeholders.  On the contrary, when crises occur, 
stakeholders question the organization’s ability to conform to the stakeholder’s rules and 
expectations.  In turn, this questions an organization’s legitimacy.  An organization will 
use communication strategically as a response to legitimacy threats because corporate 
discourse does shape how stakeholders view an organization (Allen & Caillouet, 1994; 
Marcus & Goodman, 1991).   
 The crisis response strategy can be used to a) show the challenge is invalid or b) 
attempt to get stakeholders to judge the crisis more mildly and evaluate the organization 
more positively (Allen & Caillouet, 1994).  From the neoinstitutional perspective, 
organizations should favor the use of crisis response strategies that reflect efforts to re-
establish legitimacy (Coombs & Holladay, 1996).  “Neoinstitutional research consistently 
indicates corporate actors use mechanisms and procedures to convey conformity with 
their institutional environment to enhance legitimacy and survival chances” (Allen & 
Caillouet, 1994, p.  48).  
Coombs and Holladay (1996) argue that organizations must shift the focus from 
the violation of social norms (the crisis) to efforts designed to repair the violation 
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because, if a crisis cannot be shown to be invalid, crisis managers should use strategies 
that show how the organization has returned to the norms held by its stakeholders.   
Attribution and neoinstitutional theories provide the framework for the SCCT, 
which is organized into three parts: the crisis situation, crisis response strategies, and the 
matching recommendations (Coombs, 2007). 
The Crisis Situation 
 A crisis situation will generate particular attributions of crisis responsibilities or 
the degree to which the organization is perceived to be responsible for the crisis event 
(Coombs, 2007).  According to Coombs (2007), the level of crisis responsibility is a 
primary indicator of how much a threat the crisis is to the organization’s reputation and 
what crisis response strategies are necessary to address that threat.  The crisis situation 
basically involves crisis types and threat intensifiers.  Threat intensifiers will be discussed 
and described shortly, however, crisis types simply provide categories for crises.  Each 
crisis type is different in that it situationally provokes different stakeholder views and 
evaluation of responsibility.  Each crisis type will generate a specific level of crisis 
responsibility.  The SCCT is built on a taxonomy of thirteen crisis types, which have 
been divided into three clusters (Coombs, 2007).  Each of the crisis types in a cluster 
shares a similar level of crisis responsibility with the others (Coombs & Holladay, 2002).  
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Crisis types by level of crisis responsibility 
 
Attributions of crisis responsibility, high:  Preventable cluster 
 Human breakdown accidents:  Human error causes an industrial accident. 
 Human breakdown recalls:  Human error causes a product to be recalled. 
 Organizational misdeed with no injuries:  Stakeholders are deceived without injury. 
Organizational misdeed management misconduct:  Laws are regulations are violated by 
management. 
Organizational misdeed with injuries:  Stakeholders are placed at risk by 
management and injuries occur. 
 
Attributions of crisis responsibilities, moderate:  Accidental cluster 
 Challenges:  Stakeholders claim an organization is operating in an inappropriate manner. 
Megadamage:  A technical accident where the focus is on the environmental damage 
from the accident.   
Technical breakdown accidents:  A technology or equipment failure causes an 
industrial accident. 
Technical breakdown recalls:  A technology or equipment failure causes a product 
to be recalled. 
 
Attributions of crisis responsibilities, low:  Victim cluster 
 Natural disaster:  Acts of nature that damage an organization, such as an earthquake. 
 Rumors:  False and damaging information about an organization is being circulated. 
 Workplace violence:  Current or former employee attacks current employees onsite. 
 Product tampering/malevolence:  External agent causes damage to an organization.  
FIGURE 1 From “The Development of the Situational Crisis Communication Theory,” by T. 
Coombs, 2007.  In T. L. Hansen-Horn and B. D. Neff (Ed.), Public Relations: From Theory to Practice 
(pp. 262-277).  Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson.      
 
Threat intensifiers strengthen the reputation damage a crisis can cause on an 
organization and include crisis history, relationship history, and severity (Coombs, 2007).  
Coombs (2007) defines the threat intensifiers as follows: Crisis history includes similar 
crises an organization has had in the past.  News stories often include reports if an 
organization has experienced similar crises.  Relationship history indicates if the 
organization has had a record of good works or bad behavior.  Relationship history is 
concerned with how the organization has treated its stakeholders in the past.  
Organizational behavior is a key factor in determining reputations.  Stakeholders feel it is 
important for an organization’s words and deeds to match (Herbig, Milewicz, & Golden, 
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1994).  Together, crisis and relationship history are known as performance history 
because they are indicators of how the organization has acted in the past.  Severity is the 
amount of damage inflicted by the crisis, including injuries, loss of lives, financial loss, 
and environmental destruction.   
 If an organization has a negative crisis history, negative relationship history, 
and/or the crisis damage is severe, the reputational damage of the crisis type is intensified 
(Coombs, 2007).  As seen in Table 1, the crisis types are divided into three clusters based 
on similar, initial attributions of crisis responsibility:  preventable, accidental, and victim.  
It is suggested, that if a crisis intensifies, it should move a crisis type to the next level.  
According to Coombs’ (2007), the threat intensifiers indicate what crisis response 
strategy is appropriate.   
 According to Blazer and Sulsky (1992), a favorable relationship history should 
produce a halo effect, acting as a shield that protects the organization from the 
reputational damage of a crisis.  So, a favorable pre-crisis relationship with stakeholders 
should benefit an organization (Birch, 1994; Fearn-Banks, 1996; Siomkos & Shrivastava, 
1993).  When a positive relationship is established with stakeholders, a crisis that sheds 
negative light on an organization or when the cause of a crisis is still unknown, the 
attributions of the crisis responsibility and the organization’s reputation will be affected 
for a more positive outcome for the organization. 
Crisis Response Strategies 
 In its current form, the SCCT includes 10 crisis response strategies, grouped into 
three postures.  A posture represents a set of strategies that share similar communicative 
goals and vary in terms of their focus on protecting the crisis victims (victim orientation) 
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and taking responsibility for the crisis (Coombs, 2007).  It is important to understand that 
the key word that links crisis types and crisis response strategies is responsibility.  The 
attribution and neoinstitutional theoretical concepts are reflected in the three postures that 
represent the three basic communicative options. 
Crisis response strategies by postures   
 
Deny posture (low concern for victim and responsibility acceptance) 
 
Attack the accuser:  Crisis manager confronts the person or group claiming something is 
wrong with the organization. 
Denial:  Crisis manger claims that there is no crisis. 
Scapegoat:  Crisis manger blames some person or group outside the organization for the 
crisis. 
 
Diminish posture 
 
Excuse:  Crisis manger minimizes organization responsibility by denying intent to do 
harm and/or claiming inability to control the events that triggered the crisis. 
Justification:  Crisis manager minimizes the perceived damage caused by the crisis. 
 
Deal posture (high concern for victim and responsibility acceptance) 
 
Ingratiation:  Crisis manager praises stakeholders and/or reminds them of past good 
works by the organization. 
Concern:  Crisis manger expresses concern for the victims. 
Compensation:  Crisis manager offers money or other gifts to victims. 
Regret:  Crisis manager indicates the organization feels bad about the crisis. 
Apology:  Crisis manager indicates the organization takes full responsibility for the crisis 
and asks stakeholders for forgiveness. 
 
FIGURE 2 From “The Development of the Situational Crisis Communication Theory,” by T. 
Coombs, 2007.  In T. L. Hansen-Horn and B. D. Neff (Ed.), Public Relations: From Theory to Practice 
(pp. 262-277).  Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson. 
 
According to Coombs (2007), the deny posture represents a set of strategies that 
claim no crisis occurred or that the accused organization has no responsibility for the 
crisis.  If there is no crisis, there can be no organizational responsibility for a crisis 
(attribution theory) and no violation of legitimacy (neoinstitutional theory).  The diminish 
posture reflects a set of strategies that attempt to alter stakeholder attributions by 
29 
reframing how stakeholders should interpret the crisis (attribution theory).  Crisis 
managers might try to place distance between the organization and the crisis, thereby 
seeking to reduce responsibility for the crisis.  The deal posture represents a set of 
strategies that seek to improve the organization’s reputation in some way.  By protecting 
victims and accepting responsibility, crisis managers encourage stakeholders to judge the 
organization more positively or less negatively.  An organization in an intentional crisis is 
expected to address victim concerns, so the crisis response strategy must demonstrate the 
organization is meeting expectations/adhering to social norms, which is a tenant of 
neoinstitutional theory.   
 The deal posture includes the concern strategy that is an expression of 
compassion.  Although automatically used when there are victims, the concern strategy is 
optional when no one seems to be harmed.  Moreover, the grouping shows that an 
expression of concern is viewed very similarly to apology and regret, which are the two 
crisis response strategies that can open an organization to legal liability. 
Modeling the Process 
To obtain a better understanding of the relationship between variables, the SCCT 
is shown in model form.   
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Situational Crisis Communication Theory model 
 
 
FIGURE 3 From “The Development of the Situational Crisis Communication Theory,” by T. 
Coombs, 2007.  In T. L. Hansen-Horn and B. D. Neff (Ed.), Public Relations: From Theory to Practice 
(pp. 262-277).  Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson. 
The relationships are based on the propositions below (Coombs, 2007, pp. 268-269). 
1. Organizational reputation proposition:  There is a strong, negative correlation 
between organizational reputation and crisis responsibility.  Attributions of crisis 
responsibility have a strong effect on perceptions of organizational reputation.  
The stronger the attribution of crisis responsibility, the more the crisis can damage 
the organizational reputation and, in turn, affect future interactions with the 
organization (potential supportive behavior). 
 
2. Potential supportive behavior proposition:  A strong, positive correlation exists 
between organizational reputation and potential supportive behavior, intentions to 
engage in acts that would help an organization.  A negative reputation should 
result in less supportive behavior from stakeholders, while a positive reputation 
should engender more. 
 
3. Severity proposition:  Severity has a significant intensifying effect on crisis 
responsibility and damage to organization reputation.  As the crisis increases in 
severity (inflicts greater damage), attributions of crisis responsibility will 
intensify.  Severity of an incident tends to increase perceptions of responsibility 
among individuals.  The same dynamic is believed to hold true for organizations 
in crisis.  Severity is also an indication of deviation from the norm.  Greater 
severity suggests a greater violation of the expected norms and could result in 
direct damage to the organization’s reputation.   
 
4. Crisis history proposition:  An unfavorable crisis history has a significant 
intensifying effect on crisis responsibility and damage to organizational 
reputation.  Organizations that have experienced similar crises in the past will be 
attributed greater crisis responsibility and suffer more direct reputational damage 
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than an organization with no history of crises.  The history of crises indicates that 
the crisis is part of a pattern of behavior by the organization, another negative act 
by the organization and not an anomaly. 
 
5. Relationship history proposition A:  An unfavorable relationship history has a 
significant intensifying effect on crisis responsibility and damage to the 
organizational reputation.  An organization that has treated stakeholders badly in 
the past will be attributed greater crisis responsibility and suffer more direct 
reputational damage than an organization with a neutral or positive relationship 
history. 
 
6. Relationship history proposition B:  a favorable relationship history has a 
significant reducing effect on crisis responsibility and damage to the 
organizational reputation.  Organizations that have maintained favorable 
relationships with stakeholders will see weak attributions of crisis responsibility 
and less reputational damage for a crisis than those with neutral or unfavorable 
ones. 
 
7. Crisis response strategy selection proposition:  Organizations will suffer less 
reputational damage from a crisis and experience greater potential supportive 
behavior if they match the crisis response strategy to the reputational threat of the 
crisis.  See Figure 4 for a list of general recommendations.  These propositions 
emulate how SCCT forms a relationship between crisis situations and crisis 
response strategies.  
 
List of crisis response recommendations 
Rumor:  Use any of the denial strategies. 
Natural disaster:  Use instructing information. 
Workplace violence:  Use instructing information. 
Product tampering:  Use instructing information. 
Product recall, technical error, megadamage; and Accidents, technical error:  Use excuse and/or 
justification. 
History, relationship history, and/or severe damage:  Use any of the deal strategies. 
Product recall, human error and accidents, human error:  Use any of the deal strategies. 
Organizational misdeeds:  Use any of the deal strategies. 
When victims occur:  Use the concern crisis response strategy in combination with other 
recommended strategy (ies). 
FIGURE 4 From “The Development of the Situational Crisis Communication Theory,” by T. 
Coombs, 2007.  In T. L. Hansen-Horn and B. D. Neff (Ed.), Public Relations: From Theory to Practice 
(pp. 262-277).  Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson. 
32 
Matching Crisis Situations to Crisis Response Strategies and Limitations 
 The SCCT maintains that as attributions of crisis responsibilities and/or the threat 
of reputational damage increases, crisis managers must use crisis response strategies that 
reflect a greater concern for victims and take more responsibility for the crisis (Coombs, 
2007).  Figure 4 provides a list of crisis response recommendations to serve as guidelines 
provided by the SCCT.  For example, a low organizational crisis such as a technical-error 
would require nothing more than an excuse to justify the error.  However, if the same 
error keeps occurring, crisis managers would have to implement strategies from the deal 
posture because stakeholders may look at the crisis as something that is preventable 
rather than an accidental technical error.  Coombs (2007) argues that the concern crisis 
response strategy should be applied to any crisis with victims to express compassion. 
 Like any other developing theory, the SCCT has its limitations.  It posits that by 
matching the proper crisis type to the proper crisis response strategy, an optimum 
solution will be achieved in resolving a crisis.  However, Coombs (2007) states that legal 
and/or financial liabilities can restrict what an organization can and cannot say and 
sometimes organizations may become inoperable if such heavy liabilities are taken by an 
organization.  Apologies, and in some states expression of regret, will result in significant 
legal liabilities and financial costs (France, 2002).  In order to lessen an organization’s 
liability for a crisis, many crisis managers use a less effective diminish strategy.  SCCT 
allows crisis managers to understand the effect of choosing a nonmatching strategy by 
indicating why the effectiveness of the response is reduced (Coombs, 2007). 
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Terminological Changes.  Since its appearance on a flowchart in 1995, SCCT has 
gone through many changes, terminologically and technically.  The historical 
development can be divided into terminological changes, research-driven, and theory 
testing (Coombs, 2007).  
The ‘S’ in the acronym SCCT, stands for situational.  However, when the theory 
was first introduced, the “S” stood for symbolic.  The term symbolic was chosen because 
the crisis response strategies were viewed as symbolic resources that could be employed 
during a crisis because words are symbols, hence, crisis response strategies were 
symbolic resources (Coombs, 2007).  Later, many researchers thought the term symbolic 
to be problematic because the word symbolic represents a type of action and nothing 
substantive.  Eventually, symbolic was replaced with situational because the theory is 
premised on the crisis situation (Coombs, 2007). 
 The threat intensifiers began as modifiers.  However, research showed that 
negative performance histories drove the effect of the modifiers, termed the Velcro effect 
(Coombs & Holladay, 2001).  Coombs (2007) found that negative performance history 
served to intensify the attributions of crisis responsibility and the damage to the 
organizational reputation, so the name was changed.  Another notable change was that 
the names technical error and human error of the crisis type category evolved from 
technical breakdown and human breakdown.  It was observed that breakdown was too 
cumbersome and error captured the essence of the crisis types more parsimoniously 
(Coombs, 2007).   
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Research-Driven Changes.  Perhaps the most substantive growth of the SCCT 
was the change in representation of crisis types on a continuum rather than a grid.  The 
information entered in the grid was easily entered.  However, when all information was in 
its proper place, the grid of information did very little to explain the effects of the crisis 
types.  Originally, crisis types were viewed as a 2-by-2 grid representing personal control 
(whether the organization could control the source of the crisis) and external control 
(whether an external agent was in control of the source of the crisis) (Coombs, 1995; 
Coombs, Hazleton, Holladay, & Chandler, 1995).  However, research has found that 
external control contributes little to the explanation of variance for SCCT (Coombs, 
2007). 
In the early development of SCCT, it was thought that crisis responsibility was 
predicted by personal control.  However, later research showed that personal control and 
crisis responsibility were essentially the same variable (Coombs & Holladay, 2001, 
2002).  Personal control and crisis responsibility were later combined together to form 
one category. 
Testing the SCCT 
To test SCCT, measures were developed to test the central concepts of 
organizational reputation, crisis responsibility, and potential supportive behavior.  The 
organizational reputation concept was derived from McCroskey’s (1966) measure of 
character (trust and past and current conceptualizations of reputation).  His original 
model had 10-items, but was later scaled down to five items and still held its reliability 
range of .80 to .92. 
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 Crisis responsibility was measured by using two types of scales:  McAuley, 
Duncan, and Russell’s (1992) Causal Dimension Scale II (CDSII) and Griffin, Babin, and 
Darden’s (1992) blame scale.  The Causal Dimension Scale II, or CDSII, assesses 
attributions of controllability of an even while the blame scale assesses who is 
responsible for the event.  While the scales went through wording and evaluative 
modifications to fit the mold of the organization (Coombs & Holladay, 2002), the final 
seven-item scale demonstrated reliabilities similar to that of the organizational reputation 
measure with a range of .80 to .91.   
 The potential supportive behavior measure is the only scale that was developed 
from scratch by Coombs.  The idea of this measure is to find out how a stakeholder might 
act toward an organization after a crisis and if people intend to behave in ways that are 
favorable to the organization after the crisis (Coombs, 2007).  The potential supportive 
behavior scale demonstrated reliabilities between .81 to .87. 
 Out of all of the scales, organizational reputation has been the most extensively 
tested.  According to Coombs (2007), five students have found a significant negative 
correlation between crisis responsibility and organization reputation.  The average 
correlation across these studies r = -.415.  The correlations were found across the entire 
range of crisis types, including organization misdeeds, human-error accidents, technical 
errors accidents, technical-error recalls, workplace violence, and product tampering 
(Coombs, 1998, 1999a; Coombs & Holladay, 2001, 2002; Coombs & Schmidt, 2000). 
 Three studies used organizational misdeeds, human-error crisis, technical-error 
crisis, workplace violence, product tampering, and technical-error recall to test the crisis 
history proposition.  Crisis history was found to have a significant effect on organization 
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reputation for all but the technical-error recall and a significant effect on crisis 
responsibility for all but product tampering and technical-error recall (Coombs, 1998, 
2002b; Coombs & Holladay, 2001).  This finding was termed the Velcro effect, as the 
unfavorable condition attracted and snagged additional reputational damage (Coombs & 
Holladay, 2002). 
 A human-error accident crisis was used to test the relationship history 
propositions of the theory.  The results stipulate that the unfavorable relationships history 
was found to have a significant effect on organizational reputation and crisis 
responsibility which showed its support for A.  On the contrary, however, B was not 
supported because a favorable relationships history was no different than having no 
relationship history (Coombs, 2007).  As with a crisis history, a Velcro effect was 
observed; only the negative condition had an effect (Coombs & Holladay, 2001). 
 The severity proposition was tested in one study using technical-error accident 
and organizational misdeed crisis types.  The results indicated that severity of the crisis 
damage did not affect either organizational reputation or crisis responsibility as 
anticipated (Coombs, 1998). 
 The potential supportive behavior proposition has been examined in two studies 
using organizational misdeed and human-error accident crisis types.  Organizational 
reputation, r=.37, and potential supportive behavior correlated, r=.48. 
 The crisis response strategy selection proposition was tested in two studies using 
organizational misdeed and technical-error accident crisis types.  According to the studies 
conducted, the matched strategies (those recommended by SCCT) performed better than 
the mismatched strategies.  The SCCT matches each crisis to its most appropriate 
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response strategy.  Coombs (2007) stated that meaningful matching is possible only if 
there is some correspondence/link between crisis types and crisis response strategies 
`while the mismatched conditions included using responses that accepted greater 
responsibility than recommended by SCCT, to prevent finding an effect by simply using 
lower, less-effective crisis response strategies (Coombs & Holladay, 1996; Coombs & 
Schmidt, 2000).   
Purpose and Hypotheses 
 
This study attempts to contribute to current theory-driven research in crisis 
communication by examining crisis response strategies from a communication-centered 
perspective.  Specifically, this study seeks to further understanding of situational crisis 
communication theory by examining the effect of crisis response strategies on public 
perceptions of an organization in an accident crisis situation.  To accomplish this 
objective, three hypotheses were developed. 
H1: In an accident crisis situation, a matched organizational response 
message will produce a more positive perception of organizational 
reputation than an unmatched organizational response strategy.  
 
H2: In an accident crisis situation, a matched organizational response 
message will produce a more positive perceptions of crisis 
responsibility for an organization than an unmatched 
organizational response strategy. 
 
H3: In an accident crisis situation, a matched organizational response 
message will produce a more positive potential supportive 
behavior than an unmatched organizational response strategy. 
  
It is a primary goal of this study to learn more about the effectiveness of crisis 
response strategies in producing the desired outcome for organizations in crisis.  This 
study seeks to test the propositions of the situational crisis communication theory and 
identify the message strategies most effective in producing positive public perceptions of 
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organizational reputation, crisis responsibility, and potential supportive behavior of 
publics toward an organization in crisis, specifically an accident.  To the test the proposed 
hypotheses, the methodology section will provide, in detail, how each hypotheses will be 
tested. 
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Chapter Three 
Methodology 
Research Participants 
The participants for this study were 90 undergraduate students enrolled in an 
introductory mass communication class at a large southeastern university.  Crises produce 
unique forms of publics for organizations, victims, and nonvictims.  Victims are those 
who are directly affected in some way (e.g., evacuated from an area, injured physically, 
or lost property).  The focus of this present study is on nonvictims.  Nonvictims are not 
affected by the crisis but follow the crisis in the news media because they are part of the 
organization where the possible crisis could occur.  The students fit the parameters of the 
nonvictim population because they share the characteristics of being directly associated 
with an organization where a possible crisis could occur and they hold strong perceptions 
of the organization prior to a possible crisis.   
 Of the participants, 63.3% were female (n=57) and 36.7% were male (n=33).  The 
respondents ranged in age from 18 to 40 years old (M=19.93, SD=2.96).   
Design and Materials 
  
The Campbell & Stanley one-shot case study (intervention and post-test) required 
the development of one scenario.  A limitation of this design can occur when treatments 
are not randomized, however, treatments were randomized in this study to address this 
limitation.  One response to one particular crisis was developed for the study.  The 
matched response had the organization taking full responsibility of the crisis and 
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conveying an apologetic response to its stakeholders.  An accident was selected for the 
crisis type for two reasons.  First, accidents are a common type of crisis (Irvine & Miller, 
1996).  The results of applied research are more beneficial when they address issues that 
have a direct impact on someone and/or something.  The lessons are more valuable when 
they can be applied more frequently.  Second, accidents provide a greater variance in 
perceptions (Coombs & Holladay, 2001).  Accidents vary in terms of the perceptions 
formed about the crisis and the organization in crisis.  For instance, technical breakdowns 
and workplace violence produce minimal perceptions of crisis responsibilities, whereas 
human error produces fairly stronger perceptions of crisis responsibilities (Coombs, 
1999a).  Even though there are ways to help in the prevention of accidents, stakeholders 
can perceive accidents very differently.  That is why it is important to utilize a crisis type 
that demonstrates variance on many of the perceptual variables used in a study.  
Instrumentation  
  
For this study, a hypothetical crisis was developed based on a possible crisis 
situation that could have potential serious repercussions for stakeholders if ever this crisis 
occurred.  In this case, the budget cuts that are affecting all public universities in Florida, 
especially the University of South Florida and the USF School of Mass Communications, 
is expected to reduce many of its communications class offerings.  As a result, students 
would be required to participate in random drawings for the classes they need.  
Regardless of tenure, all students are entered into the drawing equally.  Depending on 
how some student’s names are randomly selected, this process has the potential to 
dramatically delay student’s course work which means more money and more time spent 
at the university because there is not enough faculty to teach all of the classes needed to 
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accommodate all of the students.  The following message was used as the matched 
response: 
 “For the first time in 35 years, Florida is experiencing a severe 
economic downturn, resulting in a drop in tax collection and a decrease of 
the amount of state money available to State University System 
Institutions, i.e., USF.  The budget cut strips the University of 
approximately $51 million or 15% of our overall budget.  Because of these 
large budget cuts, the university has to reduce many of its current course 
offerings because the university is not able to employ enough faculty to 
accommodate current students.  Unfortunately, many courses at USF will 
be part of a new course enrollment process.   
 This new course enrollment process enters student’s names into a 
lottery for needed courses.  Names will be selected randomly until each 
course is full.  Due to the overwhelming number of students and limited 
course availability, all students are entered into the drawing equally, 
regardless of academic level or area of study.   
 It is important to understand that USF’s overall concern is to our 
students.  The school has always made it a priority to accommodate its 
students and your overall collegiate success.  We know how this budget 
cut is going to dramatically disturb a large number of your graduation 
plans and USF is fully committed to doing whatever is necessary so that 
this will not happen.  USF may have to limit the number of new students 
and/or eliminate some programs, but your graduation and academic plans 
will not be affected by this economic crisis.  If you have any questions or 
concerns, please do not hesitate to contact myself or my staff.” 
 
The next message shows the unmatched response that was used in the 
instrumentation:  
 
For the first time in 35 years, Florida is experiencing a severe economic 
downturn, resulting in a drop in tax collection and a decrease of the 
amount of state money available to State University System Institutions, 
i.e., USF.  The budget cut strips the University of approximately $51 
million or 15% of our overall budget.  Because of these large budget cuts, 
the university has to reduce many of its current course offerings because 
the university is not able to employ enough faculty to accommodate 
current students.  Unfortunately, many courses at USF will be part of a 
new course enrollment process.   
 This new course enrollment process enters student’s names into a 
lottery for needed courses.  Names will be selected randomly until each 
course is full.  Due to the overwhelming number of students and limited 
course availability, all students are entered into the drawing equally, 
regardless of academic level or area of study.  More information about this 
course enrollment system will be announced in late November. 
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This experimental design involved the manipulation of crisis history for the 
scenario.  Three scales were employed to test the dependent variables in the study: (a) 
organizational reputation, (b) crisis responsibility, (c), potential supportive behavior. 
Organizational Reputation.  Organizational reputation was measured using five 
items from Coombs and Holladay’s (1996) 10-item Organizational Reputation Scale, 
which is an adaptation of McCroskey’s (1966) scale for measuring ethos.  Specifically, 
an adaptation of the Character subscale of McCroskey’s Ethos Scale was used to assess 
organization reputation (Coombs & Holladay, 2002).  In this instance, character is used 
as a trustworthiness and good will of the source, that is, an assessment of the degree to 
which USF is concerned about its students.  McCroskey’s items were modified by simply 
replacing the term speaker with USF.  The five items used in the present study were: (a) 
“USF is concerned with the well-being of its publics,” (b) “USF is honest and open to its 
publics,” (c) “I trust USF to be honest and open about the situation,” (d) “Under most 
circumstances, I would be likely to believe what USF says,” (e) “USF is not concerned 
with the well-being of its students.” 
Crisis Responsibility.  Crisis responsibility was measured using Griffin, Babin, 
and Darden’s (1992) three-item scale for blame.  In this measure, organization was 
replaced with the term USF.  The three items were: (a) “Circumstances, not USF, are 
responsible for the crisis,” (b) “The blame for the crisis lies with USF,” (c) “The blame 
for the crisis lies in the circumstances, not USF.”  
Potential Supportive Behavior.  This final measurement was adapted from a 
Coombs (1999a) 8-item scale comprised of a list of actions an organization might ask 
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stakeholders to perform.  However, the scale was modified into a 5-item version that used 
two items from the original scale where the term organization was replaced with USF.   
The items are: (a) “I intend to say nice things about USF to other people” and (b) “I 
intend to call or email my state government officials to voice my concern on this crisis 
that is affecting USF.”  The last three items were specifically developed for this 
experiment.  The items are: (c) “I plan to continue my college education at USF,” (d) 
“intend to support USF’s administrative decision,” and (e) “I plan to transfer to another 
academic institution to complete my degree.” 
Procedures 
Each respondent received a packet containing a cover page with instructions, one 
stimulus crisis case, and a copy of the survey instrument.  The order of the materials in 
the packet was 1) a cover page, 2) a stimulus, and 3) a copy of the survey instrument.  
Each respondent read the stimulus and completed the survey instrument accordingly.  
Respondents were verbally instructed to read carefully each case and then respond to the 
questions following the case.  The administration required about 10 to 15 minutes. 
44 
 
 
Chapter Four 
Results 
This study attempts to contribute to current theory-driven research in crisis 
communication by examining crisis response strategies from a communication-centered 
perspective.  Specifically, this study seeks to further understanding of situational crisis 
communication theory by examining the effect of crisis response strategies on public 
perceptions of an organization in an accident crisis situation.  To accomplish this 
objective, three hypotheses were developed. 
H1: In an accident crisis situation, a matched organizational response 
message will produce a more positive perception of organizational 
reputation than an unmatched organizational response strategy.  
 
H2: In an accident crisis situation, a matched organizational   response 
message will produce a more positive perceptions of crisis 
responsibility for an organization than an unmatched 
organizational response strategy. 
 
H3: In an accident crisis situation, a matched organizational response 
message will produce more positive potential supportive behavior 
than an unmatched organizational response strategy. 
 
Study of Participants 
To test the hypotheses posited by this study, a 1x2 factoral experiment was 
conducted.  The experiment utilized a balanced design that included 90 college students 
enrolled at a large southeastern university.  The participants included 33 males and 57 
males.  Participants ranged in age from 18 to 40, with an average age of 19.93 years.  
Table 1 presents the frequencies and percentages of the sex and academic year of the 
participants.   
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Table 1. Sex and academic year of participants 
Variable Frequency Percentage 
Sex                      male    
                         female 
33 
57 
36.7 
63.3 
Year             freshman 
                  sophomore 
                          junior 
                          senior 
37 
18 
32 
3 
41.1 
20.0 
35.6 
3.3 
 
Measures of Variables of Interest 
Prior to the hypotheses testing, the internal consistency of the multi-item scales 
used to test the variables of interest was assessed using Cronbach’s alpha to find the 
reliability coefficients.  The five items included to test organizational reputation produced 
a reliability coefficient of .79.  The three items included to test crisis responsibility 
produced a reliability coefficient of .86.  The four items included to test organizational 
control produced a reliability coefficient of .78.  Five items were included to test 
supportive behavior, and the alpha indicated scale reliability by dropping the item “I 
intend to call or email my state government officials to voice my concern on this crisis 
that is affecting USF.”  After this item was omitted, the four remaining items produced a 
reliability coefficient of .87.  
Overall, the Cronbach’s alpha scores, shown in Table 2,  indicate reliability for 
the multi-item scales used to measure the variables of interest.  According to Berman 
(2002), alpha values between .80 and 1.00 indicate high reliability.  It is also agreed that 
the lower limit of .70 is still a useful measure of constructs (Broom & Dozier, 1990; 
Stacks, 2002).  
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Table 2.  Cronbach’s alpha for multiple-item indexes 
Variable α Number of items 
Organizational Reputation .79 5 
Crisis Responsibility .86 3 
Organizational Control .78 4 
Supportive Behavior .87 4 
 
 Next, an evaluation of means for each variable of interest was performed prior to 
creating composite measures for hypothesis testing.  An evaluation of the items used to 
measure organizational reputation produced mean scores ranging from 3.34 to 3.80.  The 
mean and standard deviation for each item used to measure organizational reputation is 
shown in Table 3. 
Table 3.  Organizational Reputation descriptives 
Variable N Mean Std. Deviation 
1orgrep1 90 3.31 .830 
2orgrep2 90 3.80 .914 
3orgrep3 90 3.34 1.007 
4orgrep4 90 3.51 .890 
5orgrep5 90 3.46 .950 
 
An evaluation of the items used to measure crisis responsibility produced mean 
scores ranging from 2.30 to 2.54.  The mean and standard deviation for each item used to 
measure crisis responsibility is shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Crisis Responsibility descriptive 
Variable N Mean Std. Deviation 
6cr1 90 2.54 .996 
7cr2 90 2.30 .854 
8cr3 90 2.30 .893 
 
  An evaluation of the items used to measure organizational control produced mean 
scores ranging from 2.49 to 2.72.  The mean and standard deviation for each item used to 
measure organizational control is shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Organizational Control descriptive 
Variable N Mean Std. Deviation 
9oc1 90 2.49 1.063 
10oc2 90 2.50 1.008 
11oc3 90 2.72 1.017 
12oc4 90 2.53 .877 
 
An evaluation of the items used to measure potential supportive behavior 
produced mean scores ranging from 2.61 to 3.80.  The mean and standard deviation for 
each item used to measure potential supportive behavior is shown in Table 6. 
Table 6.  Potential Supportive Behavior descriptive 
Variable N Mean Std. Deviation 
13sb1 90 3.80 1.210 
14sb2 90 3.67 1.122 
15sb3 90 3.06 1.193 
16sb4 90 3.39 1.371 
18sb5 90 2.61 .991 
 
 An evaluation of the items used to measure overall effectiveness produced mean 
scores ranging from 2.46 to 2.50.  The mean and standard deviation for each item used to 
measure overall effectiveness is shown in Table 7.    
Table 7.  Overall Effectiveness descriptive 
Variable N Mean Std. Deviation 
19eff1 90 2.48 .951 
20eff2 90 2.46 1.007 
21eff3 90 2.50 1.030 
 
 Finally, items used to measure each variable of interest were collapsed into 
composite measures for each variable.  The mean scores for the composite measures 
ranged from 2.38 to 3.48.  The mean and standard deviation for the composite measures 
are shown in Table 8. 
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Table 8.  Mean and standard deviation for composite measures 
Composite Measure N Mean Std. Deviation 
Organizational Reputation 90 3.48 .678 
Crisis Responsibility  90 2.38 .808 
Organizational Control 90 2.56 .767 
Potential Supportive 
Behavior 
90 3.48 1.041 
Overall Effectiveness 90 2.51 .812 
 
Test of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 posited that in an accident crisis situation, a matched organizational 
response message will produce a more positive perception of organizational reputation 
that an unmatched organizational response strategy.  To test this hypothesis, an 
independent-samples t- test was conducted.  The results indicated that an unmatched 
response (N=45, M=3.57, SD=.692) produced a higher mean score than the predicted 
matched response (N=45, M=3.40, SD=.65).  However, the difference in means was not 
significant, t (88) = -.506, p = .793.  These results indicate the matched response does not 
yield a more positive perception of organizational reputation; therefore H1 is not 
supported.   
 Hypothesis 2 posited that in an accident crisis situation, a matched organizational 
response will produce more positive perceptions of crisis responsibility for an 
organization than an unmatched organizational response strategy.  To test this hypothesis, 
an independent-samples t-test was conducted as well.  The results indicated that a 
matched response (N=45, M=2.45, SD=.832) produced a higher mean score than an 
unmatched response (N=45, M=2.31, SD=.786) as initially predicted.  However, the 
difference in means was not significant, t (88) = -.527, p = .691.  These results indicate 
that the matched response yielded a more positive perception of crisis responsibility; 
therefore H2 is not supported.   
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Hypothesis 3 posited that a matched organizational response message will 
produce more positive potential supportive behavior than an unmatched organization 
response strategy.  An independent-samples t-test was also used to test this hypothesis.  
The results stipulated that an unmatched response (N=45, M=3.55, SD=.997) produced a 
higher mean score than the predicted matched response (N=45, M=3.41, SD=1.09).  
However, the difference in means was not significant, t (88) = -1.129, p = .417.  These 
results indicate that the matched response yielded a more positive perception of crisis 
responsibility; therefore H3 in not supported.  
Exploration of Individual Item Differences 
Following the hypothesis testing, exploration analysis was conducted to determine 
if significant differences existed between the matched and unmatched crisis responses for 
each individual item.  Table 9 shows the mean and standard deviation for each item used 
to measure the variables of interest in this study.   
 
Table 9.  Individual item mean and standard deviation 
 Crisis Type N Mean Std. Deviation 
1 Org ReP: 
“USF is concerned 
with the well-
being of its 
publics” 
        matched 45 3.27 .837 
    unmatched 45 3.36 .830 
2 Org Rep:  
“USF is basically 
dishonest” 
        matched 45 3.71 .920 
   unmatched 45 3.89 .910 
3 Org Rep: 
“I do NOT trust 
USF to tell the 
truth about the 
incident” 
matched 45 3.20 1.014 
      unmatched 45 3.49 .991 
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4 Org Rep: 
“Under most 
circumstances, I 
would be likely to 
believe what USF 
says” 
matched 45 3.40 .863 
      unmatched 45 3.62 .912 
5 Org Rep: 
“USF is not 
concerned with the 
well-being of its 
students” 
matched 45 3.40 .889 
      unmatched 45 3.51 1.014 
6 CR:  
“Under most 
circumstances, I 
would be likely to 
believe what USF 
says” 
matched 45 2.49 1.014 
      unmatched 45 2.60 .986 
7 CR: 
“The blame for the 
crisis lies with 
USF” 
matched 45 2.47 .919 
      unmatched 45 2.13 .757 
8 CR: 
“The blame for the 
crisis lies in the 
circumstances, not 
USF” 
matched 45 2.40 .915 
      unmatched 45 2.20 .869 
9 OC: 
“The cause of the 
crisis was 
something that 
USF could 
control” 
matched 45 2.31 .973 
      unmatched 45 2.67 1.128 
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10 OC: 
“The cause of the 
crisis is something 
over which USF 
had no power” 
matched 
      unmatched 
45 
45 
2.42 
2.58 
1.011 
1.011 
    
11 OC:  
“The cause of the 
crisis is something 
that was 
manageable by 
USF” 
          matched 45 2.67 1.066 
      unmatched 45 2.78 .974 
12 OC: 
“The cause of the 
crisis is something 
over which USF 
had power” 
  matched 45 2.60 .939 
       unmatched 45 2.47 .815 
13 SB: 
“I plan to continue 
my college 
education at USF” 
  matched 45 3.80 1.254 
       unmatched 45 3.80 1.179 
14 SB: 
“I intend to say 
nice things about 
USF to other 
people” 
  matched 45 3.53 1.160 
       unmatched 45 3.80 1.079 
15 SB: 
“I intend to 
support USF’s 
administrative 
decision” 
  matched 45 2.93 1.195 
       unmatched 45 3.18 1.193 
16 SB: 
“I plan to transfer 
to another 
academic 
institution to 
complete my 
degree” 
   matched 45 3.36 1.464 
unmatched 45 3.42 1.288 
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17 SB: 
“I intend to call or 
email my state 
government 
officials to voice 
my concern on this 
crisis that is 
affecting USF” 
   matched 45 3.31 1.427 
unmatched 45 2.56 1.324 
18 EFF: 
“I am satisfied    
by the way USF 
has managed this 
crisis” 
matched 
      unmatched 
45 
45 
2.69 
2.53 
.973 
1.014 
19 EFF: 
“I believe that 
USF’s response to 
this crisis is 
effective” 
   matched 45 2.44 .893 
unmatched 45 2.51 1.014 
20 EFF: 
“I do not believe 
USF has handled 
this crisis as well 
as it could have” 
    matched 45 2.49 1.079 
unmatched 45 2.42 .941 
21 EFF: 
“I am comfortable 
that USF 
responded to the 
crisis in a manner 
that 
accommodated to 
the student’s best 
interest.” 
    matched 45 2.38 1.072 
unmatched 45 2.62 .984 
 
 Separate independent samples t-tests were conducted on each item to determine if 
any of the mean scores for the matched and unmatched crisis responses were significantly 
different.  Only the item, “I intend to call or email my state government officials to voice 
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my concern on this crisis that is affecting USF,” indicated a significant different between 
matched (N=45, M=3.31, SD=1.43) and unmatched (N=45, M=2.56, SD=1.32) 
responses.  The Results are shown in Table 10. 
 
Table 10.  Independent Sample t-tests 
  Levene's Test for Equality
of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)  
1 Org ReP*: 
“USF is concerned with 
the well-being of its 
publics” 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.069 .793 -.506 88 .614 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -.506 87.994 .614 
2 Org Rep*:  
“USF is basically 
dishonest” 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.119 .731 -.922 88 .359 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -.922 87.990 .359 
3 Org Rep*: 
“I do NOT trust USF to 
tell the truth about the 
incident” 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.029 .866 -1.367 88 .175 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -1.367 87.957 .175 
4 Org Rep*: 
“Under most 
circumstances, I would be 
likely to believe what 
USF says” 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.131 .719 -1.187 88 .238 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -1.187 87.740 .238 
5 Org Rep*: 
“USF is not concerned 
with the well-being of its 
students” 
Equal variances 
assumed 
1.834 .179 -.553 88 .582 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -.553 86.527 .582 
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6 CR*:  
“Under most 
circumstances, I would be 
likely to believe what 
USF says” 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.159 .691 -.527 88 .600 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -.527 87.932 .600 
7 CR*: 
“The blame for the crisis 
lies with USF” 
Equal variances 
assumed 
4.989 .028 1.878 88 .064 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  1.878 84.862 .064 
8 CR*: 
“The blame for the crisis 
lies in the circumstances, 
not USF” 
Equal variances 
assumed 
1.213 .274 1.064 88 .290 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  1.064 87.768 .290 
9 OC*: 
“The cause of the crisis 
was something that USF 
could control” 
Equal variances 
assumed 
1.803 .183 -1.601 88 .113 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -1.601 86.138 .113 
10 OC*: 
“The cause of the crisis is 
something over which 
USF had no power” 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.018 .893 -.730 88 .467 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -.730 88.000 .467 
11 OC*:  
The cause of the crisis is 
something that was 
manageable by USF” 
Equal variances 
assumed 
1.517 .221 -.516 88 .607 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -.516 87.299 .607 
12 OC*: 
“The cause of the crisis is 
something over which 
USF had power” 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.738 .393 .719 88 .474 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  .719 86.280 .474 
13 SB*: 
“I plan to continue my 
college education at USF” 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.066 .798 .000 88 1.000 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  .000 87.670 1.000 
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14 SB*: 
“I intend to say nice 
things about USF to other 
people” 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.665 .417 -1.129 88 .262 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -1.129 87.540 .262 
15 SB*: 
“I intend to support USF’s 
administrative decision” 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.180 .672 -.971 88 .334 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -.971 88.000 .334 
16 SB*: 
“I plan to transfer to 
another academic 
institution to complete my 
degree” 
Equal variances 
assumed 
1.627 .205 -.229 88 .819 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -.229 86.592 .819 
17 SB*: 
“I intend to call or email 
my state government 
officials to voice my 
concern on this crisis that 
is affecting USF” 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.642 .425 2.604 88 .011 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  2.604 87.506 .011 
18 EFF*: 
“I am satisfied    by the 
way USF has managed 
this crisis” 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.029 .866 .743 88 .460 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  .743 87.853 .460 
19 EFF*: 
“I believe that USF’s 
response to this crisis is 
effective” 
Equal variances 
assumed 
1.143 .288 -.331 88 .741 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -.331 86.622 .741 
20 EFF*: 
“I do not believe USF has 
handled this crisis as well 
as it could have” 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.448 .505 .312 88 .756 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  .312 86.403 .756 
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21 EFF*: 
“I am comfortable 
that USF responded 
to the crisis in a 
manner that 
accommodated to 
the student’s best 
interest.” 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.250 .618 -1.127 88 .263 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -1.127 87.356 .263 
*Org Rep = Organizational Reputation; CR = Crisis Responsibility; OC = Organizational Control; SB = Potential 
Supportive Behavior; EFF = Overall Effectiveness 
Each of the hypotheses and the meaning of the corresponding results will be 
discussed in the following chapter.  From the examination, conclusions are formed and 
recommendations are offered for future research. 
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Chapter Five 
Discussion 
 This study examined the situational crisis communication theory to test if the 
theory would preserve an organization’s reputation in the wake of a crisis.  The SCCT 
offers a set of principles that guide the selection of the crisis response strategies in order 
to maximize reputational protection (Coombs & Holladay, 2002).  SCCT provides crisis 
managers with guidelines for understanding which response strategies are most 
appropriate for a given crisis type (Coombs, 1995).  In an attempt to contribute to the 
development and refinement of the SCCT, three hypotheses were tested in this study. 
 H1, which states that in an accident crisis situation, a matched organizational 
response message will produce a more positive perception of organizational reputation 
than an unmatched organizational response strategy, was not supported by the results of 
this study.  This finding does not confirm the premise of the situational crisis 
communications theory and, therefore, does not add to the validity of the theory.   
 H2, which states that in an accident crisis situation, a matched organizational 
response message will produce a more positive perception of crisis responsibility for an 
organization than an unmatched organizational response strategy, was not supported by 
the results of this study.  Although not supported, this was the only hypothesis that 
suggested slight support for the matched response.  It was not a significant amount; 
however, there was opportunity that, with more research, it significant results could 
possibly emerge. Per the results, this finding does not confirm the premise of the 
58 
situational crisis communications theory and, therefore does not add to the validity of the 
theory. 
 H3, which states that in an accident crisis situation, a matched organizational 
response message will produce a more positive potential supportive behavior than an 
unmatched organizational response strategy.  This finding does not confirm the premise 
of the situational crisis communications theory and, therefore, does not add to the validity 
of the theory.  
It was hypothesized that in an accident crisis situation, a matched organizational 
response message will produce a more positive perception of organizational reputation, 
crisis responsibility, and potential supportive behavior than an unmatched organizational 
response strategy.  All hypotheses were not supported by the results of the study.   
It should also be discussed, the item that the alpha indicated that should be 
dropped from organizational reputation to give a better scale reliability.  By dropping the 
item “I intend to call or email my state government officials to voice my concern on this 
crisis that is affecting USF,” a better coefficient was achieved.  With all other responses 
suggesting low involvement from the participants, what provoked the students to want to 
go above and beyond to contact the government? 
When all previous studies on the SCCT indicate that a particular result should 
occur, but the results come back inconclusive, it must be taken into consideration that 
there were unfactored variables that were not considered while conducting the study. 
 The first variable that should be discussed is the lack of apathy from the 
participants.  The study did not take the participants presumptive opinion about USF into 
consideration which could have made the study clearer to why the participants answered 
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the questions in the manner that they did.  Knowing the participants presumptive opinion 
about USF is a key factor in this study because each stakeholder’s view on an 
organization varies and some of the participants in the study could have had a 
predisposed opinion that did not favor USF which may have caused heavily opinionated 
responses that ultimately proved every hypothesis inconclusive. 
 The next variable up for discussion is low involvement from participants.  This 
should not be ruled out for the cause of insignificant data because it could simply be that 
the participants did not care to be highly involved in the study because, even though the 
crisis was purely hypothetical, it did not affect their academic plans and if the study had 
nothing to do with them, then it is very clear to see why the participants would not be as 
involved in something that did not have a direct affect on their academic careers. 
 Besides the prediction of low involvement from the participants, a valid limitation 
on the results that is beyond the researcher’s control could stem from the fact that the 
participants were part of a large class that is constantly saturated with surveys and 
experiments from graduate students because the class produces a large number for a 
diverse outcome of results.  
 Another factor that was discovered while analyzing the results was that too much 
information was disseminated before the actual experiment was administered.  The 
participants of the study were alerted that the crisis in the experiment was purely 
hypothetical even before the participants received the survey to complete.  With this 
major factor, it should be made aware that the results of this study should be assessed 
skeptically and that this could be one of the main reasons why the results came out the 
way they did.  
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 Although the results from the study did not produce significance that was 
supposed to further validate the SCCT, a more significant discovery was found that is 
more important than if this study actually furthered SCCT’s validation.  While trying to 
group a hypothetical crisis with USF in the center, it was very difficult to categorize the 
crisis type because the crisis types list did not accommodate the type of crisis that may 
occur at an educational institution or organization of the sort.  This is crucial to the SCCT 
because if it were an actual implemented theory, it would be very difficult for a crisis 
manager to craft an effective response for a crisis type that does not have a category.   
 As described on page 25, it would appear that a hypothetical crisis of this caliber 
would fit in organizational misdeed with no injuries, organizational misdeed management 
misconduct, or challenges.  However, if examined closer, in a crisis like this; 
stakeholders are never deceived, laws or regulations are not violated by management 
(administration), and the educational institution is not operating in an inappropriate 
manner no matter the responsibility acceptance level.  If this crisis did not fit any of the 
predisposed crisis types, then it must be concluded that another crisis type and/or a more 
detailed description must be added to accommodate this type of crisis. 
Future Research 
 Research should begin to assess how crisis types are perceived.  Through the 
scant research on the SCCT are researchers paying enough attention to make sure that 
there is a category for every type of possible crisis?  Because my study was a 
hypothetical crisis that could severely affect the educational institution’s stakeholders and 
it did not fit any of the 13 different types of crises.  If there is not room for a crisis type of 
this caliber, then one must be conjured because all assumptions in crisis management 
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must be accurate if these assumptions are being used to recommend plans of action for 
crisis managers. 
Conclusion 
 Despite limitations, the present study offers some insight on the effect of a crisis 
on perceptions organizations involved in crisis.  It is important that the SCCT be tested to 
build reliable social science and to contribute to the constant changing and developing of 
crisis communication management.  Results from this study do not support the SCCT in 
validating that a matched response is more effective than an unmatched response.  
However, it should be taken into serious account that if this study were to be duplicated 
and all limitations were covered and/or corrected, the results would support the SCCT 
which will provide more information to crisis managers in crafting more strategic 
messages that will more effectively protect an organization’s reputation. 
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